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ABSTRACT
Most groups do less violence than they are capable of. Yet while
there is now an extensive literature on the escalation of or
radicalisation towards violence, particularly by ‘extremist’ groups
or actors, and while processes of de-escalation or de-radicalisation
have also received signiﬁcant attention, processes of non- or
limited escalation have largely gone below the analytical radar.
This article contributes to current eﬀorts to address this limitation
in our understanding of the dynamics of political aggression by
developing a descriptive typology of the ‘internal brakes’ on
violent escalation: the mechanisms through which members of
the groups themselves contribute to establish and maintain limits
upon their own violence. We identify ﬁve underlying logics on
which the internal brakes operate: strategic, moral, ego
maintenance, outgroup deﬁnition, and organisational. The
typology is developed and tested using three very diﬀerent case
studies: the transnational and UK jihadi scene from 2005 to 2016;
the British extreme right during the 1990s, and the animal
liberation movement in the UK from the mid-1970s until the early
2000s.
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Relatively few groups consistently undertake lethal violence, and few if any carry out as
much violence as they appear capable of (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Chermak, Freilich, &
Suttmoeller, 2013; LaFree, Morris, & Dugan, 2010). It seems somewhat surprising therefore
that while there has in recent decades been considerable investment in understanding
how and why political violence, particularly that involving actors from ‘extremist
groups’,1 escalates (e.g. Alimi, Demetriou, & Bosi, 2015; Borum, 2011; McCauley & Moska-
lenko, 2017), and while there has also been signiﬁcant attention given to processes of de-
escalation or de-radicalisation (e.g. Becker, 2017; Crenshaw, 1991; Cronin, 2009; Ross &
Gurr, 1989), processes of non- or limited-escalation – why extremists or extremist
groups don’t do more violence than they do – have received far less attention (Bjørgo
& Gjelsvik, 2017; Cragin, 2014; Simi & Windisch, 2018). Where they have received attention,
the primary focus has tended to be primarily on the non-radicalisation of individuals
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(Cragin, 2014; Jaskoski, Wilson, & Lazareno, 2017; Knight, Woodward, & Lancaster, 2017;
Simi & Windisch, 2018) rather than on group- or movement-level processes; or on identify-
ing the diﬀering characteristics between less and more violent organisations (Asal,
Schulzke, & Pate, 2017; Chermak et al., 2013) – research which, while insightful, tells us rela-
tively little about how violent escalation is inhibited.
This article makes a step towards addressing this gap in our understanding of the
dynamics of political aggression. It does so by developing a descriptive typology of the
‘internal brakes’ on violent escalation: the mechanisms through which the members of
the groups themselves inhibit their adoption or diﬀusion of greater violence. This is not
to dismiss or downplay the importance of external constraints. Part of the explanation
for non- or limited escalation will almost always lie in the way that the opportunities, capa-
bilities and motivations to carry out greater violence are inhibited by the actions of, for
example, opponents, state actors and the general public, as well as other external con-
straints (e.g. della Porta, 1995; Lehrke & Schomaker, 2016; Matesan, 2018; Oliver &
Myers, 2002). Yet while detailed accounts of decision-making within extremist groups
make clear that non- or limited escalation is also likely to be shaped by intra-group pro-
cesses (e.g. Crenshaw, 1991; Shapiro, 2013), to date such internal brakes have rarely
been examined systematically. The premise for this article is that developing a descriptive
typology of the internal brakes on violent escalation – i.e. a typology concerned with
describing and categorising such brakes, rather than one that seeks to assess their eﬀec-
tiveness and the conditions under which they are more or less eﬀective – can provide
researchers and analysts with a vocabulary and a set of concepts that they can then use
to develop and test more complex hypotheses about how group members contribute
to establish and maintain the limits on their own violence, and how this in turn contributes
to wider processes of the non- or limited escalation of conﬂict.
To develop and test the typology, we draw on existing research on escalation, de-esca-
lation and non-escalation of violence, and three contrasting case studies: the transnational
and British jihadi scene from 2005 to 2016; the British extreme right during the 1990s, and
the animal liberation movement in the UK from the mid-1970s until the early 2000s.
In what follows, we ﬁrst describe how the typology was developed. We then present the
typology, before reﬂecting on some of the limitations and challenges associated with the
development and application of the typology, and considering future avenues for research.
Development of the typology
Development of the typology occurred across three phases. The ﬁrst comprised the
deﬁnition of the scope and focus of the typology; the second comprised the initial assem-
bly and coding of the case studies; and the third comprised an iterative process of typology
development and reﬁnement, using the case studies to critically interrogate the emergent
typology, and drawing on the theoretical literature to reﬁne categories within the typology.
Phase I: establishing the typology’s scope and focus
The initial literature review encompassed published empirical and theoretical research on
social movements and contentious politics; terrorism and terrorist organisations; conﬂict
de-escalation; and micro- and meso-level dynamics of violence and desistance. Based
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on the initial literature review we deﬁned the scope and focus of the typology in ﬁve
ways.
(1) We established as the focus intra-group eﬀorts to inhibit tactical radicalisation rather
than ideological radicalisation. While ideological and tactical radicalisation sometimes
intersect, the relationship between them is complex. It is therefore useful to dis-
tinguish between the two (Abrahms, 2012; Borum, 2011; McCauley & Moskalenko,
2017).
(2) We deﬁned escalation as a process relative to the group’s existing action repertoire.
Diﬀerent forms of violence – e.g. interpersonal violence versus mass casualty attacks
– might be associated with diﬀerent social and emotional dynamics (Simi & Windisch,
2018). In addition, the relative scarcity of groups willing to deploy lethal force (Asal &
Rethemeyer, 2008; LaFree et al., 2010) would seem to indicate that the gradient of
escalation – the ease or diﬃculty with which people might move from one level of vio-
lence to the next – is generally steeper in the shift from serious physical harm to lethal
force than, say, from ﬁst-ﬁghts to ﬁghts using non-bladed weapons. We conceive of
both as escalation, however. Whether speciﬁc brakes are more or less prominent at
diﬀerent levels of escalation was set up as a question for analysis.
(3) Due to considerations of observability, we adopted an analytical focus on the practices
through which group members sought to inhibit violent escalation. This meant that
intra-group rather than individual psychological processes were the main focus of
attention.
(4) We excluded from our analysis developments within a movement’s culture that
appeared to limit violence in a way that was overwhelmingly incidental. For
example, while there is some evidence that patterns of drug and alcohol consumption
aﬀect patterns of violence (Simi & Windisch, 2018), we did not consider general
changes in drug and alcohol consumption an internal brake unless this was done
explicitly to inhibit violence or public disorder (e.g. Busher, 2016, p. 113).
(5) Movement boundaries are notoriously diﬃcult to deﬁne and ‘who belongs’ is often a
source of contention among activists (Blee, 2012, pp. 52–80). As such, while we gen-
erally considered brakes ‘internal’ if they were applied by any actor within the broadly
conceived movement, we recognised that ‘internal’ and ‘external’ are usually matters
of degrees. Interactions within a faction are more ‘internal’ than interactions between
actors in diﬀerent factions of the same organisation, which are more ‘internal’ than
interactions between actors in diﬀerent organisations within the wider movement.
To accommodate this, we took the position that the extent to which a brake is
‘internal’ is a function of the extent to which the actor(s) applying the brake (Actor
A) is recognised by the actor(s) to whom the brake is being applied (Actor B) as
part of their group or movement.2
The above resulted in a working deﬁnition of ‘internal brakes on violent escalation’ as:
the practices through which actors who are recognised as group members seek either: (a) to
inhibit directly the adoption or diﬀusion of more violent tactics by other group members; or
(b) foment strategic decisions and (sub)cultural practices the logical consequences of which
are to inhibit the adoption or diﬀusion of more violent tactics.
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The objective in developing the typology then was (a) to provide a vocabulary to
describe and categorise all such practices as they were identiﬁed across the three case
studies and within the wider literature review; (b) organised within a structure that is
theoretically coherent; and (c) with the minimum of categorical overlap.
Phase II: preparing and coding the case studies
As described above, the three case studies used to develop the typology were trans-
national and British jihadi groups between 2001 and 2016; the British extreme right
during the 1990s, and the animal liberation movement in the UK from the mid-1970s
until the early 2000s. The selection of these case studies was based on a ‘most-diﬀerent
case comparative strategy’ (della Porta, 2013, pp. 25–29) with two axes of variation: ideol-
ogy and the scope and scale of violence.
The jihadi case provided an example of an ostensibly religious movement that promotes
and applies lethal violence, albeit some actors within the movement engaged in eﬀorts to
manage the parameters of that violence. This case study had two empirical focal points. The
ﬁrst was on how actors within the UK (Al-Muhajiroun and a network of friends convicted of
planning acts of terrorism in 2016) responded to eﬀorts to expand the scope of violence
spearheaded by the so-called Islamic State (IS). While Al-Muhajiroun publicly embraced
more radical forms of violence, within the network of friends somemembers began to ques-
tion the validity and eﬃcacy of tactics displayed by IS. This part of the case study uses sec-
ondary academic literature pertaining to Al-Muhajiroun in the UK, and court transcripts of
private discussions online involving members of the network of friends.
Reﬂecting the transnational dimensions of the jihadi movement, the second empirical
focal point of the case study comprised global debates within the jihadi milieu, with a
focus on the Al-Qaeda leadership’s eﬀorts to instil caution about violent escalation
during this period. This part of the case study is based on public statements (speeches,
press releases and other media outreach) from the Al-Qaeda leadership between 2001
and 2016, and internal correspondence from within Al-Qaeda’s inner circle dating from
2005, when concerns were expressed about the tactical direction taken by IS’s predecessor
organisation, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and from the period immediately preceding the raid on
Usama bin Ladin’s compound in Pakistan in May 2011.
The extreme right case provides an example of mobilisation around a racial-nationalist
ideology where, while there is signiﬁcant interpersonal violence, lethal violence is rare and
the period under analysis is characterised by a signiﬁcant attempt to shift away from vio-
lence towards orthodox political campaigning. The speciﬁc empirical focus of the case is
on the British National Party (BNP) during the 1990s as it strove to achieve electoral legiti-
macy whilst simultaneously struggling to contain the actions and growing inﬂuence of its
own radical ﬂank – Combat 18 (C18) – which the BNP itself had initially formed to defend
the party from a direct action campaign against it by Anti-Fascist Action (AFA). While
further escalation did take place within the radical ﬂank, here too there were observable
limits on violence, with actions that exceeded established parameters of ‘acceptable’ vio-
lence provoking intra-movement opposition, disillusionment and disengagement (Collins,
2011). Where higher levels of violence did take place, it was largely directed at targets
within the movement and served to reduce the capacity of the group to prosecute vio-
lence against external rivals.
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The extreme right case is based upon a survey of the secondary academic literature,
extreme right publications, activist memoirs, journalistic accounts of the groups in ques-
tion, contemporary newspaper reports, television documentaries, and an interview with
an anti-fascist activist active during the period.
The animal liberation case study focussed on the radical ﬂank of the animal rights
movement, characterised by their willingness to use illegal forms of direct action in
order to advance campaigns for animal rights, providing an example of a single issue
movement. The evolution of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) is central to this case
study, as are the campaigns carried out under other organisational banners, such as the
Animal Rights Militia and the Justice Department, which entailed escalation beyond estab-
lished repertoires of action. While positioning itself as a nonviolent movement and exhort-
ing activists to take all reasonable measures to avoid harm to living beings, animal
liberation activists have perpetrated acts of violence, including serious property damage
and intimidation, which have undoubtedly caused physical and psychological harm to
human and non-human animals. Yet within this case study interpersonal violence is
very rare, even when state repression signiﬁcantly inhibited the availability of non- or
less violent strategies of action (Ellefsen, 2016; Monaghan, 2013).
The animal liberation case study is based on secondary academic literature, journalistic
accounts of the movement, contemporary media reports, television documentaries, acti-
vist memoirs, movement publications, and interviews with two former animal liberation
activists, and an academic expert.
Such diverse case studies were chosen to enable us to interrogate the broad applica-
bility of the typology – a strategy increasingly encouraged by researchers of political vio-
lence (della Porta, 2013; Freilich, Chermak, & Gruenewald, 2015). While other cases studies
might cast further light on how internal brakes function and the conditions under which
they are more or less eﬀective, we assessed that, within a context of limited ﬁnancial and
time resources, the selected case studies provided suﬃcient variation for the initial devel-
opment of the descriptive typology.
For each case study, primary and secondary data were initially coded for instances in
which group members cautioned against escalation, sought to prevent escalation as it
was unfolding, or engaged in post-hoc criticism or sanctioning of fellow activists who
had participated in violent escalation. These instances were then organised into descrip-
tive categories which were used ﬁrst to develop and then to interrogate the emergent
typology.
Phase III: developing, testing and reﬁning the typology
The third phase comprised an iterative process of moving between the emergent typol-
ogy, the case studies and the theoretical literature in order to develop, test and reﬁne
the typology. The typology went through ﬁfteen iterations in total. In initial iterations,
potential brakes were identiﬁed by coding up from the literature review and the case
studies. Instances of similar braking practices were then clustered together and described.
Within each iteration we sought to limit overlap between the brake descriptions while
ensuring the typology continued to encompass all relevant observed practices.
As the list of brakes expanded we organised the emergent brakes into sets, construct-
ing a two-tier categorisation of higher-order codes, which we refer to as ‘brakes’, and
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lower-order codes, which we refer to as ‘sub-brakes’. Over subsequent iterations we devel-
oped, tested and reﬁned the descriptions of the ‘brakes’ and ‘sub-brakes’ by seeking to
apply these descriptions to the case study material and the relevant academic literature.
We neither intended nor expected to ﬁnd all of the brakes and sub-brakes in each case
study, but did seek to ensure that brakes were mutually intelligible across the case studies.
Through this process, we developed a typology in which the brakes and their respective
sub-brakes are organised according to the underlying logics on which they operate. We
identiﬁed ﬁve logics: strategic logic, moral logic, the logic of ego maintenance, the logic
of outgroup deﬁnition, and organisational logic (see below).3 While these logics some-
times overlap with one another, we identiﬁed suﬃcient instances when they appeared
to be distinct from or independent of one another to warrant this categorisation.
We also identiﬁed that brakes can be categorised according to their relevant proximity
to the potential act of violent escalation. Here, adapting and inverting Waddington, Jones,
and Critcher’s (1989) analysis of the ‘structuration of violence’ in relation to public disorder,
we developed an analysis of three levels of proximity: campaign planning; action planning,
and the situational level. Due to space limitations, however, in this article we focus only on
the brakes as categorised by the logics on which they work.
The typology: internal brakes and their operating logics
In this section we set out and summarise each of the ﬁve brakes and associated sub-
brakes, and the logics on which they operate. This is summarised in Figure 1.
Brake 1. Identiﬁcation of non- or less violent strategies of action as being as or
more eﬀective than more violent alternatives (strategic logic)
Brake 1 operates on questions about ‘what works?’ or ‘how best can we achieve our objec-
tives?’ Strategic logics are prominent in academic and practitioner accounts of decision-
making in radical, extremist or insurgent groups, challenging often-made assumptions
that decision-making in such groups is overwhelmingly ideologically-driven (Dudouet,
2012, p. 102).
Violent escalation is often identiﬁed as carrying numerous risks both for the group and
for individuals. Actors might therefore seek to inhibit violent escalation either by empha-
sising the eﬀectiveness of less violent, and therefore less risky, strategies of action, or by
emphasising the limited eﬀectiveness and/or potentially high costs of violent escalation.
The idea that violence is somehow counter-productive is often deployed. Brake 1 com-
prises of ﬁve sub-brakes.
Brake 1a. Expressions of scepticism about their ability to beat their opponents in a
violent struggle, including concerns that greater militancy will increase backlash or
repression from opponents or the state towards them and their supporters.
This was among the most frequently identiﬁed brakes in each case study. This is perhaps
unsurprising: people rarely undertake physical violence if they anticipate that they will lose
(Collins, 2008). In the jihadi case study, internal documents4 revealed how leaders warned
sub-commanders against expanding into new territory since this would provoke a reaction
from state apparatuses that would damage the movement. In the extreme right case
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Figure 1. The internal brakes on violent escalation and associated sub-brakes.
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study, one of the reasons why a substantial component of the movement shifted away
from the use of violence in the 1990s was because they came to believe that they were
unable to ‘out violence’ their anti-fascist opponents. In the animal liberation movement
concerns about individual and collective arrest – considered both unpleasant and ulti-
mately counter-productive – were often used to dissuade co-activists from adopting
more radical strategies of action.
This brake is also prominent in other accounts of non-escalation. Simi and Windisch
(2018, p. 8) for example note that some US white nationalist activists see mass casualty
violence as counter-productive on the grounds that it will attract ‘unwanted attention
from law enforcement’.
Brake 1b. Expressions of concern that violent escalation will undermine support for
the group
While some groups use violence to recruit members (Ligon, Harms, & Derrick, 2015), this
usually works only for a relatively small number of militants. Most groups require wider
bases of support, at least some of whom are unlikely to favour high levels of violence
(Marighella, 1969, p. 60). Emphasising the importance of achieving or sustaining
support among these publics can therefore be deployed as a brake on violent escalation.
Jihadi militants previously involved in the Algerian civil war (1991–2002), for example, used
their experience to warn colleagues that a loss of public support through excessive vio-
lence would undermine their campaigns. In the extreme right case more violent forms
of activism were identiﬁed by BNP activists as detrimental to their attempts to rally
public support around their ‘Rights for Whites’ campaign that required mass participation.
In the animal liberation case study the rise of a ‘cult of militancy’ in the early 1980s was
heavily criticised by those who insisted that meaningful change required the building
of a mass movement (Roberts, 1986).
Brake 1b might be particularly eﬀective when the imagined constituencies of potential
support overlap with their opponents’ support base because it disincentivises target
widening from their opponents to their opponents’ support base (Carter, 2017). This is dis-
cussed further under Brake 4b.
In some cases Brake 1b might take the form of threats from group members themselves
to abandon the group as a consequence of rising levels of violence (Zirakzadeh, 2002).
Brake 1c. Attempts to build or maintain ties with strategically useful allies who are
not supportive of violent escalation
The motivations to pursue or maintain these ties might be varied, including tapping in to
their resource or support base; achieving a veneer of respectability or utilising these allies
to protect them politically, militarily or physically from opponents. Regardless of the motiv-
ation, attempts to build such relationships can entail committing activists to limiting or
reducing violence. For example, in 1980 as the African National Congress sought to
build international alliances it committed to observe the Geneva Protocol relating to irre-
gular warfare (Dudouet, 2012, p. 99).
This brake was not prevalent in jihadi or extreme right case studies. Within the animal
liberation case study, there were frequent calls from moderates for collaboration and alli-
ances across the wider animal rights movement, and radical ﬂank actors perceived in some
of the more moderate organisations a potentially valuable source of ﬁnancial and logistical
10 J. BUSHER ET AL.
support. Related braking opportunities were frequently undermined however by intra-
movement tensions and the decision of some moderates to distance themselves from
radical ﬂank actors (Henshaw, 1989).
Brake 1d. Identiﬁcation of political opportunities that favour (re)adoption of non- or
less violent strategies of action
Diminished prospects for achieving political successes encourages the adoption of more
violent strategies of action (Alimi et al., 2015, pp. 24–58; Piazza, 2017). Conversely, where
activists identify increased political opportunities this can alter the balance of intra-move-
ment strategic and tactical debates in favour of non- or less-violent strategies. While this
brake is conditioned by developments external to the group, what matters from the
‘internal brakes’ perspective is how activists interpret these political opportunities. In
the extreme right case, for instance, after the BNP won a council seat in 1993, increased
– though unrealistic – expectations of their political possibilities were used to advance
the party’s reorientation away from violence, although this simultaneously accelerated dis-
sension within the radical ﬂank of the movement.
Brake 1e. Identiﬁcation of non- or less violent strategies of action that are perceived
to be eﬀective, including identiﬁcation of ‘suﬃcient’ levels of violence
Activists’ identiﬁcation of speciﬁc non- or less-violent strategies of action as ‘successful’
can serve to build support for such strategies and undermine support for violence
(Matesan, 2018). For example, while part of the reason for the BNP’s innovation away
from violence was the realisation that they were unable to ‘out-violence’ their anti-
fascist opponents, the ability of ‘modernisers’ to build support within the movement
was enhanced by the identiﬁcation of the potential of interventions such as their
‘Rights for Whites’ campaign to exploit perceived political opportunities (Copsey, 2011).
In the animal liberation movement in the early 1980s, the perceived eﬀectiveness of
mass daytime ‘invasions’ of laboratory facilities in terms of building public support and
intensifying legal and economic pressure on those laboratories quickly spawned similar
actions across the country and a brief shift away from clandestine activities. The tactical
shift was curtailed however when such invasions resulted in mass arrests (Nagtzaam,
2017, p. 71).
A variation on this brake is the identiﬁcation of what are deemed ‘suﬃcient’ levels of
violence in order to achieve their objectives. For example, activists might identify that
only a relatively low level of violence is required to disrupt an opponent’s event or to inti-
midate their opponents, and that incurring the risks of escalation beyond this level is
unnecessary. Such logic can contribute to the decision to abandon violence altogether
if an organisation accomplishes its goals (Crenshaw, 1996; Cronin, 2009).
Brake 2. Construction of moral norms and evaluations that inhibit certain forms
of violence and the emotional impulses towards violence (moral logic)
Brake 2 works on moral logic or the ‘logics of appropriateness’ (Matesan, 2018, p. 6), relat-
ing to questions about whether it is right to use violence and if so under what conditions.
Moral considerations can comprise a signiﬁcant barrier to participation in violence (Fiske &
Rai, 2015), and where moral brakes falter, this can form a source of discomfort, shame or
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remorse that might ultimately lead activists to disengage with the group (Bjørgo, 2011;
Crenshaw, 1996; Simi & Windisch, 2018).
Moral logics can be articulated through formal organisational communiqués or informal
interactions. They might align with and complement strategic logics, particularly where
utilitarian assessments are made about how violence or nonviolence contribute to cam-
paign outcomes. For example, calls by Al-Qaeda’s leadership to limit the targeting of
lethal violence to those directly involved in combat related both to strategic logics of
sustainable militant campaigns and moral logics of proportionality (al-Zawahiri, 2013).
However, moral logics can also contradict strategic logics. Activists might, for example,
have moral qualms about violent escalation even if they perceive greater violence to be
strategically expedient. Conversely, activists might assess that violence has become too
costly but continue to believe in its legitimacy, giving rise to situations in which groups
‘disengage from violence behaviourally’ but do not ‘denounce armed action or give up
all military capabilities’ (Clements, 2015; Matesan, 2018, p. 10). We identiﬁed two sub-
brakes relating to Brake 2.
Brake 2a. Articulation and performance of general moral norms and principles that
problematise certain forms of violence, require violence to be justiﬁed or enable
activists to forestall on entering the ‘tunnel of violence’ (Collins, 2008, pp. 337–369)
General moral norms and principles might encompass, for example, the conceptualisation
of violence as a tactic of last resort; conceiving of non-retaliation as virtuous; or emphasis-
ing values such as mercy and compassion. They are often articulated with reference to the
group’s expressed ideological worldview. Karagiannis and McCauley (2006, p. 325) for
example describe how prominent actors within Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan used theolo-
gical reasoning to resist pressures to sanction violence on the grounds that violence had
not been sanctioned by a suitable religious authority. Similarly, in the jihadi case study Al-
Qaeda’s leaders released detailed communiques setting out the ‘laws of war’ and the con-
sequences for breaching these (bin Ladin, 2007, 2010).
As well as requiring violence to be justiﬁed, Brake 2a can also work by aﬀording indi-
viduals or groups a way to avoid violence without losing face. For example, if non-retalia-
tion is conceived of as virtuous, and restraint presented as symbolic of a movement’s
collective ‘discipline’ or an individual’s ‘dignity’ in the face of their opponent’s eﬀorts to
humiliate them (Busher, Giurlando, & Sullivan, 2018), choosing not to respond to violence
with greater violence can be framed and experienced as a moral victory, thereby reducing
the emotional and reputational costs of non-retaliation.
Moral reasoning is highly malleable, however. Moral norms regarding nonviolence are
rarely unconditional (Fiske & Rai, 2015, pp. 35–41; Karagiannis & McCauley, 2006, p. 328),
and radical ﬂank actors might circumvent such brakes if fellow activists can be persuaded
that the conditions for legitimate violence already exist. In the jihadi case study, for
example, Al-Muhajiroun activists argued that the declaration of the caliphate by ISIS pro-
vided the religious authority for prosecuting a campaign of violence. Radical ﬂank actors
might also circumvent moral brakes with claims that their proposed violence responds to a
higher moral order (Fiske & Rai, 2015). For example, some radical ﬂank actors within the
animal liberation movement justiﬁed the destruction of property and campaigns of intimi-
dation on the grounds that they were responding to a higher moral obligation to prevent
the imminent deaths of sentient beings (Liddick, 2013).
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Brake 2b. Identiﬁcation of speciﬁc groups of actors as illegitimate targets for
violence
Even in cases of seemingly indiscriminate violence, perpetrators usually provide some justiﬁ-
cation for the location and target of the attack. Jihadist leaders, for instance, have sought to
justify ‘indiscriminate’ attacks by arguing that their victims are ‘combatants’ by proxy by virtue
of their status as tax-payers or citizens of hostile regimes, and that the Prophet’s armies set a
legal precedent for such strategies of action with the use of weaponry and tactics that were –
in principle – indiscriminate within selected boundaries, such as siege engines (al-Zawahiri,
2008). Conversely, identifying groups or individuals as illegitimate targets of violence can
limit the range of actors against whom violence can ‘legitimately’ be used.
Designating targets as illegitimate can derive from evaluations of limited culpability or
‘innocence’; whether or not they pose a threat (intersecting with Brakes 2a and 1e); or from
general moral precepts, established conventions or legal distinctions e.g. prisoners of war,
non-combatants etc. In the jihadi case, al-Zawahiri’s (2013) ‘General Guidelines for those
engaging in Jihad’, released as the rise of ISIS expanded the scope of indiscriminate sec-
tarian violence within the jihadi milieu, identiﬁed swathes of people, divided by sect, reli-
gion, nationality and other criteria, who could not be targeted unless speciﬁc conditions
were met. Similarly, internal movement documents revealed how the Al-Qaeda leadership
identiﬁed westerners who had expressed sympathy with the group’s cause as illegitimate
targets for violence (bin Ladin, 2011).
Where violence is done to ‘illegitimate’ targets, it can damage movement morale and
cohesion, and may produce moments of cognitive dissonance that ultimately lead individ-
uals or groups of activists towards disengagement. In the extreme right case, for example,
Collins (2011, p. 51) describes how participating in an attack on a group of women engen-
dered feelings of regret and shame that contributed to his eventual exit from the scene.
Brake 3. Self-identiﬁcation as a group that is either nonviolent or uses only
limited forms of violence (logic of ego maintenance)
Social movement scholars have long observed that activists’ sense of who they are is inti-
mately related with the evolution of their tactical repertoire (Smithey, 2009). In groups
where activists identify as nonviolent or as group that use violence sparingly or as a last
resort, such collective identities can inhibit violent escalation (Busher, 2018). As Asal and
Rethemeyer (2008, p. 245) observe, ‘[s]ome organizations choose not to kill’ simply
because ‘it does not ﬁt with their view of themselves’.
When a group’s behaviour does not align with members’ self-image, it can undermine
some activists’ sense of their collective identity, leading to disappointment, disillusion-
ment or even disgust (Bjørgo, 2011). In the jihadi case, chat logs from youths involved
in the planning of terrorist acts in the UK revealed how the publication of graphic ISIS
execution videos caused some members to recoil and question their assumption that
ISIS represented a just vanguard within their movement (HM Courts and Tribunal
Service, 2016). However, sudden departures from established repertoires of action can
also facilitate a profound tactical reorientation among parts of the movement. For
example, the 1993 killing of Dr David Gunn constituted a ‘decisive break’ with the US
pro-life movement’s previously non-violent protest repertoire and ‘opened the ﬂoodgates
to other violent attacks on doctors’ (Kaplan, 1995, p. 128).
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Processes of ego maintenance usually operate in parallel with moral and strategic
logics. In most groups, members conceive of themselves as good people struggling for
a noble cause; and activists often perceive strategic advantages in limiting their associ-
ation with violence (Busher, 2013, 2018). Yet sometimes these logics operate more inde-
pendently of one another. Activists may have no moral qualms regarding the use of a
particular tactic, but yet would not adopt it themselves, perhaps because of role speciﬁca-
tion within the wider movement. Logics of ego maintenance might also obviate the
requirement for moral or strategic reasoning, forestalling potentially diﬃcult and divisive
intra-movement tactical debates.
Brake 3 can be temporary, however. Activists might not envisage engaging in violence at
a particular point in time, but might imagine themselves doing so in the future, under
diﬀerent circumstances. Furthermore, activists’ self-image is dynamic, shaped by their
relationships with opponents or state security forces (Alimi et al., 2015). Among Al-Muhajir-
oun activists, for example, their self-identiﬁcation as a group not engaged in violent struggle
was severely undermined by their dismissal of the ‘covenant of security’ it purported to
respect within the UK (Connor, 2005). Brake 3 encompasses four sub-brakes.
Brake 3a. Production of group narratives that emphasise non-violence or the
limited use of violence either by themselves or by those they claim have inspired
their movement
Activists produced group narratives that emphasise their use of non- or limited-violence in
two ways. The ﬁrst was to emphasise nonviolence or restraint in accounts of their own
actions. Here, incidents in which activists could have done greater violence, but chose
not to, were of particular rhetorical value. For instance al-Zawahiri used his eulogy of
his predecessor as leader of Al-Qaeda, Usama bin Ladin, to emphasise how merciful the
latter had been, sparing the lives of enemy combatants whom he could easily have
ambushed (al-Zawahiri, 2011). Similarly, in the animal liberation case, activists’ accounts
of laboratory raids often emphasised how they had taken care to minimise the risk of
harm to human or non-human animals (e.g. Mann, 2007, p. 626). Whilst such accounts
are directed partly at external audiences, they also serve movement socialisation pro-
cesses, shaping emergent normative orders.
Activists also constructed self-narratives as a group that uses non- or only limited-vio-
lence by situating their struggle within a longer historical tradition of non- or limited-vio-
lence. Activists in the animal liberation movement frequently drew comparisons between
their campaigns and those of famous proponents of nonviolence, including Mahatma
Ghandi and Martin Luther King Jr. Similarly, in the late 1990s and early 2000s Hizb ut-
Tahrir in Uzbekistan sought to inhibit activists’ adoption of violence by conceiving of
their struggle as an imitation of the second phase of the progress of the Prophet Muham-
mad – the phase of Islamization – which, according to their particular historic interpret-
ation, precludes the use of violence unless it is in defence of Muslim lands (Karagiannis
& McCauley, 2006, pp. 325–9).
In order to undermine such brakes, some radical ﬂank activists proﬀered alternative his-
torical parallels and inspiration. In the animal liberation movement, for example, these
actors criticised their fellow activists’ reverence for Ghandi and emphasised historical par-
allels with movements such as the suﬀragists, who did deploy violence, albeit only within a
limited repertoire.
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Brake 3b. Disassociation from more violent groups or factions and/or association
with less violent groups or factions
Disassociation and association are often used to regulate ingroup identities (Berbrier,
2002). Disassociation from more violent groups or factions can both place pressure on
those doing the disassociating to put into action their claims to be diﬀerent to the
groups from which they are disassociating (Busher, 2016, pp. 110–116), and accentuate
concerns among those from whom they are disassociating about the costs of their
actions in terms of potential loss of support (Brake 1b).
While disassociation and association might often relate to speciﬁc organisations or fac-
tions, activists might also seek to disassociate from or associate with more general cat-
egories of actors. Simi and Windisch (2018, p. 15) describe for example how some US
white nationalists demurred from mass casualty violence partly because of a disjuncture
between their own identiﬁcation as fundamentally ‘normal’ people and their perception
of mass casualty violence as ‘sociopathic’.
In the case studies, disassociation came to prominence when cognate actors escalated
violence beyond established repertoires of action. For instance Al-Qaeda leaders criticised
the indiscriminate violence deployed by ISIS; senior ALF activists condemned letter-bomb
campaigns by the ‘Justice Department’ and extreme right groups rapidly disassociated
themselves from David Copeland’s London nail bomb attacks in 1999. While their
opponents may question the good faith of such pronouncements, they can nonetheless
shape activists’ understandings of the parameters of legitimate force.
Brake 3c. Opportunities to achieve intra-group respect and prestige without
undertaking or encouraging the use violence at or beyond the parameters of the
group’s action repertoire; and/or (the threat of) sanctions for activists who
advocate or undertake violence beyond established parameters
Social sanctions and rewards play a fundamental role in shaping understandings of what
is, and is not, acceptable within any given social context (Mead, 1934). Where violence is a
source of prestige, individuals are more likely to engage in violence (Fiske & Rai, 2015,
p. 285; Jaskoski et al., 2017, p. 11). Conversely, if certain forms of violence attract social
sanctions, individuals are less likely to use those (Copes, Hochstetler, & Forsyth, 2013).
Relatively few examples of this brake were encountered in the case studies, although
this might be a product of the source material available. The most prominent example
of sanctioning within the jihadi case was the unsuccessful eﬀort by Al-Qaeda’s leaders
to rein in Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, their Iraq sub-commander (al-Zawahiri, 2005; Rahman,
2005). In the animal liberation case, after an arson attack on a pub, which broke movement
protocol by endangering ‘innocent’ lives, the ALF supporters group withheld the ﬁnancial
support usually oﬀered to activists facing trial for campaign activities (Mann, 2007, p. 454).
No similar attacks were carried out thereafter.
Brake 3d. Limited expectations that they will be involved in greater levels of violence
Where people anticipate violence they are more likely to prepare for it and more likely to
identify in the actions of opponents what they perceive to be signs of forthcoming con-
frontation (Malthaner, 2017). Conversely, where people do not expect violence they are
less likely to prepare for it and are therefore less likely to be willing or able to undertake
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violence. While these expectations are partly shaped by prior experiences, they are also
based on intra-group discussions about the scale and style of violence that they plan to
undertake or expect to encounter from opponents or state security forces during forth-
coming actions.
In the extreme right case, even on the radical ﬂank, there was an expectation that
violent confrontation with anti-fascist opponents would involve a ‘tear up’ but nobody
would be murdered (Lowles, 2014, p. 18). In the animal liberation case this brake can be
seen operating in the way that hunt saboteurs anticipated and prepared for diﬀerent
levels of violent confrontation across diﬀerent local hunts based on previous encounters
with hunt supporters and the intra-movement circulation of anecdotes about these
encounters.
Brake 4. Boundary softening in relation to putative out-groups (logic of out-
group deﬁnition)
Whereas boundary activation or hardening – the process whereby social interaction is
increasingly focussed around essentialising us-against-them narratives – can fuel violent
escalation by accentuating feelings of fear, distrust and hate, boundary softening or com-
plexiﬁcation can inhibit escalation (Alimi et al., 2015; Chirot & McCauley, 2006; Fiske & Rai,
2015; Tilly, 2004). It does this by breaking down clear ‘us-versus-them’ distinctions, leaving
group members comparatively more ‘open’ to engagement with opponents, state actors
and sections of the public they might previously have considered only as a pool of active
or latent support for their opponents (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008, p. 248), thereby creating
new opportunities for the application of brakes based on strategic or moral logics. We
identiﬁed four sub-brakes under Brake 4.
Brake 4a. Resistance to generalisations about their opponents
Resistance to generalising about their opponents can create opportunities for the appli-
cation of Brakes 1b, 1c, 1e and 2b by generating more nuanced assessments about the
eﬀectiveness or appropriateness of violence. For example, it might lead to identiﬁcation
of potential future allies among their ostensive opponents (Karagiannis & McCauley,
2006, p. 236), or identiﬁcation of some ostensive opponents as being less deserving of
violence.
In the jihadi case, for example, Al-Qaeda leaders’ challenging of straightforward sectar-
ian categorisation of legitimate targets (al-Zawahiri, 2005; Rahman, 2005) created a
requirement for further moral and strategic deliberation regarding targeting. In the
extreme right case, distinctions made by some activists between far left militants and
far left newspaper sellers precipitated a moral crisis for individuals after they attacked
some of the latter (Lowles, 2014, p. 69). In the animal liberation movement, resistance
to generalisation about opponents is institutionalised as part of the ALF Credo.
Brake 4b. Identiﬁcation of segments of the public beyond their previously-imagined
support base as potential converts to their cause
Where activists identify segments of the public beyond their own imagined support base
as potential supporters, they are less likely to target them with violence or undertake indis-
criminate violence (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008, p. 248). This brake is likely to be particularly
16 J. BUSHER ET AL.
eﬀective when activists perceive substantial overlap between their potential support base
and that of their opponents (Stanton, 2015). In the extreme right case for example both
they and their anti-fascist opponents positioned themselves as the champions of the inter-
ests of the ‘working class’, thereby limiting opportunities for target widening beyond mili-
tants (Carter, 2017).
The extent to which activists ﬁnd their views articulated within nominally mainstream
discourses is likely to aﬀect the presence and eﬀectiveness of this brake (Busher, 2016,
pp. 97–122; Kaplan, 1995). Boundary softening between activists and the ‘masses’ might
also derive from fundamental philosophical principles e.g. about inclusivity and the impor-
tance of the movement being led by ‘the people’ (Crenshaw, 1996, p. 252).
Brake 4c. Limited intra-movement pressure to ‘burn-bridges’ with social contacts
outside of the movement or outside of the radical ﬂank of the movement
Loosening or cutting ties with contacts outside the movement can facilitate processes of
intense socialisation: increasing the ideological inﬂuence of the group on individual
members; reducing personal obligations outside the group; and reducing the threat of
being apprehended – all of which can favour radicalisation (Bjørgo, 1998, 2009; Simi &
Windisch, 2018, p. 11). Limited intra-movement pressure to burn bridges can inhibit
these processes, curtailing ‘the distorting inﬂuences of isolation’ (Ackerman, 2003,
p. 145; and Knight et al., 2017, p. 8).
Groups are less likely to apply substantial pressure on members to loosen or sever their
external ties when they do not identify as being strongly distinct from the broader com-
munities from which they draw their support, or when they do not perceive a substantial
inﬁltration risk.
Brake 4d. Expressed reluctance to conceive of the state security forces as ‘the
enemy’
A reluctance to frame the state security forces as the enemy might relate to strategic
logics. Confrontation with state security forces carries substantial risks both in terms of
attracting repression and undermining public support – in most liberal democracies con-
frontation with the state security services is likely to alienate substantial sections of the
public. It might also have ideological roots, however. For example, within much of the
international extreme right scene, perception of the security forces as the enemy has
been inhibited by perceptions of their underlying structural legitimacy. Here, even
when state security forces are perceived to be acting unfairly, this might be bracketed
out e.g. by conceiving of individual members of the security forces as acting out of
duty rather than ideological conviction, or drawing distinctions between frontline law
enforcement oﬃcers and the ‘powers that be’ (Busher, 2013).
Brake 5. Organisational developments that either (a) alter the moral and
strategic equations in favour of non- or limited violence and/or reduce the
likelihood of unplanned violence, or (b) institutionalise less violent collective
identities and/or processes of boundary softening (organisational logic)
Brake 5 relates to the processes through which organisational developments condition
decision-making (see Crenshaw, 1991; Shapiro, 2013). While activists will usually have
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opportunities to pursue alternate strategic pathways (Crenshaw, 1996, p. 250), most organ-
isations are characterised by a signiﬁcant degree of path dependency (Blee, 2012, pp. 35–
37). As organisations, and the individuals that comprise them, plan and undertake actions,
they develop relevant capabilities, forge collective identities, and acquire tactical habits
and tastes, cumulatively contributing to make some future courses of action more likely
than others. If a group invests in certain capabilities, they become more likely to identify
and deploy tactics utilising those capabilities (Matesan, 2018), and where group protocols
stipulate particular operating procedures, those procedures are more likely to be followed
even when they might no longer be suitable (Allison, 1969). We identiﬁed ﬁve sub-brakes
under Brake 5. It is likely that the eﬀectiveness of Brakes 5a – 5d will be associated with the
eﬀectiveness of organisational leadership, with these brakes being least eﬀective in organ-
isations experiencing ‘leadership deﬁcits’ (Abrahms & Potter, 2015), or that explicitly adopt
strategies of leaderless resistance (Chermak et al., 2013).
Brake 5a. Limited investment in capabilities to escalate violence, and development
of capabilities to undertake strategies of action that either entail non- or limited
violence or more controlled violence
Where there is limited investment in capabilities to escalate violence groups are unlikely to
be ‘particularly competent’ at undertaking higher levels of violence (Asal & Rethemeyer,
2008, p. 245). Meanwhile, developing capabilities to undertake strategies of action that
entail non- or limited-violence is likely to make their execution of those strategies more
eﬀective, thereby encouraging activists to see this as a viable course of action (Brake 1),
in turn creating opportunities for the application of Brake 3.
Groups might also invest in their capabilities to manage violence. Where the violence
relates to demonstrations, for instance, they might appoint stewards and invest in liaising
with the police before and during the event; monitoring alcohol and drug use among acti-
vists; or encouraging or coaching activists not to ‘over-react’ to provocation by opponents
or state security forces (e.g. Busher, 2013). For example, in the extreme right case study,
realisation that the most serious violence usually took place during chance encounters
between small groups of activists and their anti-fascist opponents led militants on both
sides to try to avoid such encounters (Hann & Tilzey, 2003, p. 223).
In some instances, however, an increased ability to control their violence can generate
an apparent paradox: a group might reduce the amount of violence they carry out against
‘illegitimate’ targets by developing capabilities that enable them to carry out more tar-
geted and eﬀective violence against legitimate targets (Asal, Gill, Rethemeyer, &
Horgan, 2015, p. 401).
Brake 5b. Foregrounding more modest or intermediate objectives and de-
prioritising revolutionary goals
Where groups focus on achieving intermediate objectives (e.g. winning elections as was
the case with the BNP, leading the group to de-prioritise its longer-term revolutionary
objectives), they alter the strategic logics of their action, becoming more likely to seek
to operate within, even if ultimately aiming to transform, existing legal and political
systems. They also become more likely to contemplate alliances of convenience which,
over time, might lead them to re-evaluate their relationship with some external actors,
thereby giving rise to opportunities to apply Brake 4.
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Such foregrounding of more modest or intermediate objectives might be inspired by
pragmatic evaluation of the strategic opportunities available, as exempliﬁed by the
BNP’s shift towards electoral politics in the 1990s. It might also be associated with pro-
cesses of ideological restructuring. In Nepal, for example, a ‘major ideological shift
around 2001’ resulted in Maoists moving from a position of ‘seeking a communist one-
party system to embracing competitive multi-party democracy’, which ‘reoriented their
programme towards introducing a new constitution, electing a new constituent assembly,
and establishing a republic’ (Dudouet, 2012, p. 102).
Brake 5c. Construction and maintenance of spaces in which a range of activists that
includes and extends beyond the radical ﬂank are able to freely discuss tactics and
movement objectives
Such spaces might include discussion boards, forums, magazines, meetings etc. They can
serve to inhibit violent escalation by helping anchor radical ﬂank actors into wider move-
ment cultures and expose them to reticence within the wider movement about violent
escalation (Ackerman, 2003, p. 145). These spaces might not be created with the objective
of inhibiting violent escalation. Within the animal liberation movement, Arkangel maga-
zine was established by some of the more tactically radical members of the movement
ostensibly to achieve greater cross-movement unity. However, more moderate activists
repeatedly used it to challenge the adoption of more violent strategies of action and to
criticise these tactics when they were deployed. In doing so they helped to maintain
group norms that cast such tactics as illegitimate or inappropriate.
Such spaces are more likely to be generated and maintained where activists perceive
themselves to have wider constituencies to engage with, implying potential synergies
between Brake 5c and Brakes 1b, 4b and 4c.
Brake 5d. Concerns among some group members that violent escalation will
compromise their ability to shape the movement’s direction and/or negatively
aﬀect their position within it
Any signiﬁcant change in action repertoire has the potential to alter intra-movement
power relations. Movement elites in particular might resist violence escalation if they per-
ceive that escalation is likely to undermine either their position within the movement or
their ability to shape it (Crenshaw, 1996, pp. 255–257). In the extreme right case, the
BNP leadership identiﬁed that their investment in violent capabilities via the initial for-
mation of C18 had not only tarnished their political capital but disrupted their organisation
and weakened their own ability to control their party.
Brake 5e. Concentration of energy on targeting movement rivals, leading to
reduced capability to prosecute campaigns of violence against their external
enemies
Intra-movement rivalries are a common feature of most movements. In some cases such
rivalries can give rise to radicalisation dynamics where competing factions become
engaged in processes of outbidding (De Fazio, 2014). They can, however, also act as a
brake on violent escalation if the concentration of their energies upon internal movement
rivals reduces the capacity and commitment of activists to focus their violence and aggres-
sion against external enemies (Simi & Windisch, 2018, p. 13). In the extreme right case,
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despite pretensions as a revolutionary national socialist group, C18 became engulfed by
internal feuding and score settling, its violence increasingly directed at internal targets
rather than external enemies, leading to a fratricidal murder and the group itself
imploding.
Discussion and conclusions
The objective of this project was to develop a descriptive typology of the practices
through which group members contribute to establish and maintain the limits of their
own group’s violence. In particular, we wanted to assess the possibility of developing a
typology for use across movements grounded in diﬀerent ideologies and characterised
by very diﬀerent degrees of violence.
We assess that it is possible to develop such a typology. As expected, the distribution
and prominence of the brakes varied across and within the case studies. In the jihadi case,
the most frequently applied brakes related to concerns about the loss of public support
(Brake 1b) and to moral logics (Brake 2). In the extreme right case, brakes operating on
strategic logics (Brake 1) were more evident than those that work on moral logics
(Brake 2). In the animal liberation case study, we found considerably more examples of
brakes that work on the logic of ego maintenance (Brake 3) than in the other cases,
although disassociation from more violent groups (Brake 3b) also featured prominently
in the other case studies at points when cognate groups escalated violence beyond estab-
lished action repertoires. Critically, however, we were able to develop a vocabulary that
worked across the three case studies and the examples drawn from the wider literature.
Furthermore, by organising the typology around the underlying logics on which the
brakes operate – strategic, moral, ego maintenance, outgroup deﬁnition, and organis-
ational – the typology also enables exploration of how these internal brakes work and
how they are sometimes undermined, in addition to capturing and categorising them.
It is important to draw attention to a number of challenges that those who seek to
deploy this typology are likely to encounter, above and beyond basic data access
issues. First, careful consideration is required with regards to how to interpret the presence
and/or prominence of these brakes within case material. While the intense application of
internal brakes might indicate that activists are unlikely to escalate violence, it might also
indicate that the group’s action repertoire is unstable and subject to intragroup contesta-
tion, or that the movement is undergoing a split? As such, the typology should not be read
simply as a checklist.
Second, in order to achieve a workable vocabulary across the case studies, our termi-
nology at times operates at a fairly high level of abstraction. This could make it more
diﬃcult to achieve inter-coder reliability than if we had developed a more bespoke voca-
bulary for each case study.
Third, if the typology is to be used to undertake cross-case comparisons, analysts should
consider how their ﬁndings might be aﬀected by diﬀerent availability of source material
across the case studies. It is possible that some brakes are more likely to be applied in par-
ticular types of communications e.g. more or less formal; in more or less private forums; or
material that captures decision-making versus material that captures post hoc reﬂections.
Nonetheless, we would argue that the typology opens up a number of potentially proﬁ-
table avenues of research and analysis. For security, intelligence and law enforcement
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practitioners assessing the risk of violent escalation, it might provide a further tool with
which to identify indicators of the propensity towards and away from particular forms of vio-
lence by speciﬁc groups. For those undertaking interventions with extremist groups, it might
be used to inform assessments of how externally applied counter-measures might interact
with, and sometimes undermine, internal brakes. Meanwhile, for academic researchers the
typology would appear to have clear potential to enable the development and testing of
hypotheses germane to a number of questions relating to the under-researched processes
of non- or limited escalation. Foremost among these are questions about the conditions
under which certain brakes, or conﬁgurations of brakes, are more or less likely to be
eﬀective; how the patterns and functioning of these internal brakes is aﬀected by wider
conﬂict dynamics and vice versa e.g. how they aﬀect and are aﬀected by interactions
between group members and state security services, opposition groups etc; how and
why the distribution of internal brakes varies across groups and what, if anything, this
can tell us about their propensity for violence; and how the internal brakes on violent esca-
lation operate at diﬀerent points within waves or cycles of conﬂict.
Notes
1. For the purposes of this project, we us the term ‘extremist groups’ to refer to those groups in
which a signiﬁcant proportion of members have shown a willingness to deploy or support
illegal strategies of action. We intentionally adopt a broad deﬁnition as our aim is to
develop a typology with applicability across a wide variety of groups. This deﬁnition might
be problematic in non-democratic or narrowly-democratic states where the thresholds of
illegality might be very low.
2. The role of inﬁltrators and informants provides an interesting example of the sometimes
complex interplay between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ brakes. On the one hand such actors
might be considered external. On the other hand, the fact that they are identiﬁed by group
members as part of the group means that where they seek directly to inhibit violent escalation
their actions function as internal brakes.
3. These logics are not ranked in any sense.
4. E.g. The Abbottabad papers and other primary sources held by The Combating Terrorism
Center, West Point, (https://www.ctc.usma.edu/)
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